---
title: "Puncturable Registered Attribute-Based Keyword Search Enhances Secure Cloud Data Sharing"
id: "plos-one-18-puncturable-registered-attribute-based-keyword-search-for-secure-cloud-data"
canonical_url: "https://medichelpline.com/clinical-feed/plos-one-18-puncturable-registered-attribute-based-keyword-search-for-secure-cloud-data"
content_type: "clinical_feed_article"
specialty: "Pharmacology"
source_name: "PLOS ONE (Medicine)"
source_url: "https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0363164"
published_at: "2026-11-20T14:00:00.000Z"
evidence_level: "Journal Feed"
license: "CC-BY-NC-4.0 / Informational Use"
---
# Puncturable Registered Attribute-Based Keyword Search Enhances Secure Cloud Data Sharing
## Provenance & Clinical Metadata
- **Canonical URL:** https://medichelpline.com/clinical-feed/plos-one-18-puncturable-registered-attribute-based-keyword-search-for-secure-cloud-data
- **Specialty:** [Pharmacology](https://medichelpline.com/clinical-feed/pharmacology.md)
- **Primary Source:** PLOS ONE (Medicine)
- **Source URL:** [Original Journal Publication](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0363164)
- **Published At:** 2026-11-20T14:00:00.000Z
- **Evidence Rating:** Journal Feed
## Executive GIST (TL;DR)
- The study introduces puncturable registered attribute-based keyword search (PR-ABKS) as a secure cloud data-sharing method combining encrypted keyword search and selective decryption key restriction. - PR-ABKS enables users to generate their own secret keys, with a key curator verifying public registration information without holding secrets, reducing key escrow risk. - Data owners tag encrypted files with descriptive keywords and generate searchable indexes incorporating revocation lists that exclude specific users at index creation. - Users can locally update their keys to exclude access to selected tags, preserving access to others, which requires secure erasure of prior secret states to protect against later key exposure. - The scheme addresses limitations of previous models by combining escrow-free key management, searchable encryption, and local key puncturing for tag-level access control. - Security models assume an honest-but-curious cloud server, untrusted key curator for secrets, and adaptive adversaries, emphasizing confidentiality after key updates and keyword privacy. - System entities include the key curator, cloud server, data owners, and data users, each with defined roles in registration, storage, encryption, search, and decryption. - The scheme utilizes bilinear pairing groups and a binary tree structure for user and revocation list management, enabling minimal node coverage for exclusion. - Computational, communication, and storage costs were analyzed and compared to related schemes PR-ABE and RRABKS, showing close registration and search costs with added encryption/decryption workload for combined functionality. - The research clarifies distinct operational scopes of puncturing, index-generation-time exclusion, and their interactions within a registered keyword search framework.
## Clinical Analysis & Structured Key Points
Puncturable registered attribute-based keyword search for secure cloud data sharing | PLOS One Browse Subject Areas ? Click through the PLOS taxonomy to find articles in your field. For more information about PLOS Subject Areas, click here . Article Authors Metrics Comments Media Coverage Reader Comments Figures Figures Abstract Cloud data sharing requires methods that protect sensitive files while allowing authorized users to find and access them. Centralized key generation creates a risk of key escrow, while exposed user keys may compromise previously shared data. We develop a scheme that combines encrypted keyword search with selective restriction of decryption keys in a registered framework. Users generate their own secret keys, and a key curator verifies and aggregates public registration information. Owners attach descriptive keywords and tags to encrypted files. Search compares combined keyword representations, and each new index excludes users according to the owner’s current list. Users can update their keys to remove access to selected tags while retaining access to others. Protection against later key exposure requires secure erasure of earlier secret states; existing indexes are not automatically updated when the exclusion list changes. We analyze the mechanisms and compare their computational, communication, and storage costs with two related schemes. Under the tested configuration, registration and search costs remain close to the corresponding baselines, while the combined functionality adds encryption and decryption work. The scheme provides a framework for combining encrypted retrieval with selective key restriction, clarifying the associated cost trade-offs and conditions for its use. Citation: Song Z, Guo Y, Jiang M, Yang Z (2026) Puncturable registered attribute-based keyword search for secure cloud data sharing. PLoS One 21(11): e0363164. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0363164 Editor: Suo Gao, Dalian Polytechnic University, CHINA Received: September 1, 2026; Accepted: November 4, 2026; Published: November 20, 2026 Copyright: © 2026 Song et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. The numerical data underlying Figs 4–11 are provided in S1 Dataset. The corrected research implementation of PR-ABKS is publicly available under the MIT License at https://github.com/zeyangsong002-spec/PR-ABKS . Version v1.0.0 is archived in Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23335024 . The release supports functional verification and new benchmark runs; its correspondence with the manuscript experiments and associated limitations are documented in docs/EXPERIMENT_MAPPING.md. Funding: This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Higher Education Institutions (Grant Nos. 2025AHGXZK20015, 2025AHGXZK31100, and 2023AH050331 to Y.G.; https://jyt.ah.gov.cn/ ). The funder had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. Introduction Cloud services allow individuals and organizations to store and share data without maintaining local infrastructure [ 1 ]. Sharing sensitive files requires control over access privileges, yet third-party servers cannot be assumed fully trusted. Data owners therefore need cryptographic control over outsourced data. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [ 2 ] supports one-to-many sharing by embedding an access policy in the ciphertext. Decryption requires a user attribute set that satisfies that policy [ 3 ]. Access control alone does not help users locate relevant encrypted files. Attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) [ 4 , 5 ] addresses retrieval through encrypted indexes and query trapdoors [ 6 ]. The cloud evaluates matches without receiving plaintext query keywords, with keyword privacy defined by the scheme’s security model. Many attribute-based schemes rely on an authority to generate user secret keys, creating a key-escrow risk. Registered ABE [ 7 , 8 ] instead lets users generate their own secrets. A key curator verifies and aggregates public registration information without holding those secrets [ 9 ]. Registered key management does not eliminate the consequences of user-key exposure. Puncturable encryption [ 10 ] lets an honest user update a key to exclude selected ciphertext tags before a subsequent compromise. Protection requires secure erasure of earlier usable secret states. User revocation [ 11 ] concerns a different operation: changing access to existing cryptographic objects requires an explicit update or authorization mechanism [ 12 , 13 ]. Here, the revocation list determines user exclusion when an index is generated. Our objective is to bring tag-level key puncturing into registered keyword search. The construction combines local key restriction with encrypted retrieval and index-generation-time exclusion. The system model and correctness analysis specify the distinct scope of these mechanisms. Contribution We propose puncturable registered attribute-based keyword search (PR-ABKS), which combines encrypted retrieval and selective restriction of an updated decryption key within one registered framework. Its main contributions are as follows. Tag-level puncturing within registered keyword search. Users locally update their keys to exclude selected ciphertext tags while retaining access to other tags. This capability complements encrypted retrieval under the honest-update and secure-erasure assumptions. Registered key management with index-generation-time exclusion. Users generate their own secrets, while the key curator verifies and aggregates public registration information. The revocation-list snapshot determines which users are represented in each new index. Explicit characterization of search and cost. We derive the aggregate keyword-matching predicate and compare computation, communication, and storage costs with PR-ABE and RRABKS. The analysis identifies the cost of combining searchable and puncturable components. Related work Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a widely adopted cryptographic primitive for enforcing fine-grained authorization in cloud data sharing. Bethencourt et al. [ 2 ] proposed CP-ABE, in which a data owner embeds an access policy into the ciphertext, and only users whose attributes meet the policy can recover the data. Subsequent works improved ABE from different aspects, such as outsourced decryption, verifiability, traceability, and revocation. For cross-domain sharing, Zhang et al. [ 14 ] combined CP-ABE with proxy re-encryption for industrial IoT, optimizing re-encryption-key generation and simplifying recipient-side decryption. Their construction focuses on delegated access across attribute domains and retains authority-issued attribute keys. Encrypted keyword retrieval and selective restriction of an updated user key address additional requirements in shared repositories. To support search over encrypted data, Zhang et al. [ 15 ] proposed a multi-keyword searchable and verifiable attribute-based encryption scheme, which improves search accuracy and verifies whether the cloud server returns complete results. Li et al. [ 5 ] designed a verifiable multi-keyword data publish-subscribe scheme with hidden access policy. Zhang et al. [ 16 ] introduced blockchain into attribute-based conjunctive keyword search to support result verification and fair payment. Meng and Cheng [ 17 ] proposed a server-aided traceable and revocable ABKS (STR-ABKS) scheme resistant to chosen keyword attacks. Li et al. [ 18 ] further proposed a traceable and revocable attribute-based conjunctive keyword search scheme for the multi-to-multi model. These studies improve ABKS from different aspects, including search expressiveness, verifiability, traceability, and revocation. However, they do not support tag-level puncturable key update for selective ciphertext access removal, and most of them still rely on authority-based key management. To remove the key escrow problem, Garg et al. [ 19 ] introduced registration-based encryption, in which users generate their own key pairs and a key curator only aggregates public keys. Hohenberger et al. [ 7 ] extended this idea to registered ABE, allowing users to keep their secret keys under their own control while the KC manages public registration information. Li et al. [ 20 ] proposed a revocable registered ABE scheme with user deregistration, and Weng et al. [ 9 ] designed an efficient registered attribute-based access control scheme for mobile cloud computing. These schemes demonstrate that registered key management can reduce the trust placed on traditional authorities. However, they do not simultaneously support encrypted keyword search and puncturable access removal. Puncturable encryption was introduced by Green and Miers [ 21 ] to revoke decryption capability for selected messages, recipients, or time periods without distributing new key material. Cui and Yi [ 22 ] proposed puncturable ABE with user revocation, where the authority broadcasts update information for key update. Ghopur et al. [ 23 ] designed a puncturable key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme for efficient user revocation. Li et al. [ 24 ] proposed a cloud data sharing system with flexible user revocation by introducing edge-server-assisted key puncturing. These works demonstrate that puncturing is effective for forward security, user revocation, and fine-grained access removal. However, they are not constructed under a registered ABKS framework and cannot simultaneously provide escrow-free key management and encrypted keyword search. Federated learning offers a complementary approach to using distributed data through collaborative model training while retaining raw training data locally. Liu et al. [ 25 ] proposed FedCFE to balance client personalization and global knowledge sharing through composite feature extraction and knowledge distillation. Hu et al. [ 26 ] developed AISS-VFL to reduce communication overhead in vertical federated learning through adaptive importance-aware sample selection. Bi et al. [ 27 ] introduced FedSEA to improve knowledge exchange between client groups under heterogeneous data distributions. Bi et al. [ 28 ] further proposed FedDN to address noisy clients and noisy samples jointly through dual recognition and negative learning. These studies improve collaborative learning under data heterogeneity, communication constraints, and label noise. Their training objectives complement the encrypted retrieval and access-management requirements considered here. The closest schemes are puncturable registered ABE (PR-ABE) by Wang et al. [ 29 ] and registered-based revocable ABKS (RRABKS) by Li et al. [ 30 ]. PR-ABE supplies registered key management and local puncturable key update but does not support keyword search. RRABKS supplies the registered searchable component used here. Our construction combines these mechanisms: encryption produces a tagged ciphertext and a searchable index, while local updates restrict the user’s decryption key. The correctness analysis derives the inherited aggregate search predicate and distinguishes index-generation-time exclusion from historical-index revocation. Materials and methods We introduce the cryptographic assumptions and system model, define the security requirements, and present the eight algorithms of PR-ABKS. Cryptographic preliminaries Bilinear pairing and the DBDH assumption. Let G , be two multiplicative cyclic groups of order q , and g be the generator of G . The bilinear pairin g function fulfills the following properties. Bilinearity: For , . Non-degeneracy: . Computability: , can be computed efficiently. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption: Given the tuple , where and , the DBDH assumption is to determine whether P is equal to . Binary tree. Let L denote the set of users in the scheme, and let R denote the revocation list. The binary tree BT is defined below: The user i is associated with a leaf node in the binary tree. For users in the scheme, the tree contains nodes. We use the breadth-first search method to assign numbers to the nodes so that the root node is numbered 0 and the last leaf node is numbered . The function path ( i ) denotes the path from the root to node i , and cover ( R ) is a minimum set of nodes covering all users not in the revocation list R . For each non-revoked user i , there is a unique node such that . In Fig 1 , gives cover ( R ) = {4,5,8,14}. User u 6 is assigned leaf 12, so path ( u 6 ) = {0,2,5,12} and . The selected node is therefore . Download: PNG larger image TIFF original image Fig 1. Binary tree. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0363164.g001 Let denote the leaf assigned to user j ; path ( j ) abbreviates . For , this path intersects cover ( R ) at one node. A cover node may represent several users, but and retain user-level subscripts and distinct identity keys. Cover nodes must therefore not replace user identities in component counts. Each index uses a fixed revocation-list snapshot, denoted R enc . System model and threat model The main notations are summarized in Table 1 . Download: PNG larger image TIFF original image Table 1. Summary of notations. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0363164.t001 System model and entities. The proposed scheme is designed for secure cloud data sharing with fine-grained access control, aggregate keyword matching, index-generation-time user exclusion, and local key puncturing. The system consists of four entities: the key curator (KC), the cloud server (CS), data owners (DOs), and data users (DUs) as depicted in Fig 2 . Download: PNG larger image TIFF original image Fig 2. Scheme model. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0363164.g002 KC: The key curator initializes the system, verifies public registration information, aggregates valid public keys, and generates auxiliary tokens. It neither generates nor stores users’ secret keys. DOs: A data owner defines an access policy, selects a keyword set, and assigns a ciphertext tag set for the shared data. It encrypts the data under the master public key, generates the corresponding searchable index, and uploads the ciphertext and index to the cloud server. The owner supplies R enc when generating an index. A later list change affects new index generation; it triggers no update to stored indexes, keys, or trapdoors. The KC retains its registration duties, and the CS evaluates indexes as stored. CS: The cloud server stores ciphertexts and indexes, evaluates query trapdoors, and returns matching ciphertexts. It may perform the specified partial decryption using public information and auxiliary tokens, but it does not recover plaintext. DUs: Users generate their own key pairs, submit public registration information, and create query trapdoors. They can puncture local keys and decrypt returned ciphertexts when the attribute policy and the current key’s tag restrictions permit. Threat model and security requirements. The KC follows the registration and aggregation procedures but is not trusted with user secret keys. The cloud server is modeled as honest-but-curious: it stores ciphertexts, evaluates encrypted indexes, and performs the prescribed partial-decryption operations, while attempting to infer plaintexts or keywords from the information it observes. Data users may be revoked or corrupted, and the adversary may adaptively request public keys, registration outputs, key updates, corruptions, and query trapdoors subject to the challenge restrictions defined below. The two principal security requirements are data confidentiality after key updates and privacy of the keywords embedded in searchable indexes. User exclusion is evaluated against R enc ; the construction has no historical-index or ciphertext update algorithm. Post-puncture confidentiality concerns an honest device that completes and erases all earlier usable secret states before compromise. Erasure covers old key copies, recoverable backups, and randomness or key-generation secrets, such as , that could reconstruct an earlier key with available parameters. Public registration outputs and auxiliary tokens remain available to the adversary. The objective excludes a malicious holder who retains an earlier usable key. Puncturing does not alter other users’ keys or remove previously recovered plaintext. Secure erasure is an exposure assumption, not a capability enforced by . Let K and Q be finite keyword sets using a common, unambiguous keyword representation, and define with the empty product equal to . For correctly matched identity components, tests F ( K ) = F ( Q ) rather than . Equal aggregates need not imply equal sets, and collision resistance of individual hash evaluations does not establish an aggregate-collision bound. The correctness analysis treats equal, subset, and other query sets. Throughout this paper, matching refers to this aggregate predicate unless literal set equality is stated. For the IND-KU-CPA game, let denote the challenge access policy. A disclosed key state of user i , with punctured-tag set , is inadmissible if both Here, means that the registered attributes of user i satisfy the challenge policy. This restriction applies to every disclosed state of every user, including non-target users. Before issuing a challenge, the challenger checks all prior disclosure records against the chosen policy and tag set; after the challenge, it rejects any disclosure that violates the same condition. A later puncture cannot make an earlier inadmissible disclosure admissible. Public registration information and the auxiliary tokens returned by remain available to the adversary; their secrecy is not an admissibility assumption. This restriction excludes direct decryption using an exposed, policy-satisfying unpunctured key. It does not, by itself, establish the security reduction or rule out attacks combining admissible information. The data confidentiality of PR-ABKS is defined by the indistinguishability under key updating and chosen-plaintext attacks, denoted as IND-KU-CPA. The security game is played between a challenger and a PPT adversary as follows. init : declares the challenge tag set . Meanwhile, selects a target user index , maintains an initially empty punctured-tag list for each user i , and records every disclosed key state together with its punctured-tag set at the time of disclosure. These records are not replaced by later key updates. : executes the algorithm and publishes the common reference string crs . Query I : can adaptively make the following queries. : When issues this query on , executes and returns to . : When issues this query on and , executes and returns to . : When issues this query with a tag on , executes and inserts into . : For a query on , considers the latest state . If the challenge has been fixed and the disclosure is inadmissible under the above condition, it returns . Otherwise, it records and returns that state. A disclosure before the challenge is checked when the challenge is chosen. As in the specified game, after a successful corruption disclosure, all subsequent oracle queries return ; the challenge and final guess are not oracle queries. Challenge : submits two equal-length plaintexts , a master public key , an access policy , the attached tag set , and a revocation list . The challenger checks every prior disclosure record, for target and non-target users alike, against and . If any disclosed state satisfies the inadmissibility condition above, it rejects the challenge. Otherwise, chooses a random bit , executes the algorithm with to compute the chall
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